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HOSTILE TENDER OFFERS AND INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF FOR 14(e) MANIPULATION CLAIMS:
DEVELOPMENTS AFTER MOBIL CORP. v.
MARATHON OIL CO.
Section 14(e) of the Williams Act1 amendments to the Securities
Exchange Act of 19342 ('34 Act) prohibits false or misleading statements,
material omissions, and fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative activity in
connection with a tender offer.' The prohibitions of section 14(e) extend
to all bidders and to the management of the target company in responding
to a tender offer.4 Although the language of section 14(e) closely resembles
the language of section 10(b)5 of the '34 Act and rule 10b-51 of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC),7 neither the '34 Act nor the Williams
Act defines the term manipulation.8 Federal courts, therefore, have defined
1 Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. SS 78m(d-(e),
78n(d)(f) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Congress enacted the Williams Act (the Act) to insure that
trget shareholders have access to material information concerning the tender offer on
which to base informed investment decisions. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
2 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2811,2812 [hereinafter cited as H.R.
REP. No. 1711].
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
' See 15 U.S.C. 5 78n(e) (1976) (antifraud provision for tender offers).
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1982). Under Rule 14(e)-2, promulgated by the Securities
& Exchange Commission (SEC), target management must make one of three responses to
a tender offer. See id. Management must recommend acceptance or rejection of the offer,
express no opinion on the offer, or indicate an inability to take a position on the offer.
Id. Management also must provide reasons for any position taken and is under a duty to
update disclosures if a material change occurs. Id. Although the Williams Act originally
did not require target management to respond to a tender offer, the legislative history
of the Act indicates that if management did respond to the offer, the disclosure standards
for the bidder would apply to management. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 1, at 2813,
2821 (S 14(e) obligates anyone opposing tender offer to make full disclosure to shareholders).
5 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) (§ 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
17 C.F.R. 5 240.10b-5 (1982) (Securities and Exchange Commission rule 10b-5).
, Compare 15 U.S.C. S 78j(b) (1976) (S 10(b) of '34 Act prohibits any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance) and 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5 (1982) (rule 10b-5 prohibits
manipulative and deceptive devices, untrue statements or omissions of material fact, and
any fraudulent acts or practices in connection with purchase or sale of securities) with 15
U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976) (§ 14(e) prohibits any material, false statements or omissions and any
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices in connection with any tender offer).
8 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) (S 10(b) prohibits any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance); 15 U.S.C. 5 78n(e) (1976) (S 14(e) prohibits any fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative acts or practices). See generally 3 L. Loss. SEcURITIES REGULATION, 1531-70 (1961)
(reviewing development of manipulation concept in securities markets); Note, Tender Offer
Defensive Tactics-Federal Regulation of Management's Prerogative, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
633, 638-40 (1981-82) [hereinafter cited as Tender Offer Defensive Tactics] ("manipulation"
under '34 Act). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act) explicitly lists prohibited
manipulative practices under S 9 and § 10. Id. at 638; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78j (1976). Courts
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section 14(e) manipulation according to judicial interpretation of
manipulation under section 10(b).9
In 1977, the Supreme Court stated in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green"0 that section 10(b) manipulation generally refers to practices that
mislead investors by artificially affecting the market price of stock.1 The
Court explained that nondisclosure usually is necessary to insure successful
manipulation of securities prices. 2 The Santa Fe Court also stated that
breach of fiduciary duty, absent deception or nondisclosure, does not violate
section 10(b) or rule 10b-5." The Court held that Congress enacted the
'34 Act primarily to insure full disclosure during securities transactions,
and that state law provides adequate remedies for fiduciary violations
absent fraud. 4
use the explicitly prohibited practices under S 9 and S 10 to infer a general definition of
manipulation as acts occurring within the marketplace intended to distort the market's
valuation of securities. See Tender Offer Defensive Tactics, supra at 638-39.
In a 1970 amendment to S 14(e) of the Williams Act, Congress granted the SEC the
authority to promulgate rules concerning the definition of fraudulent, deceptive, and
manipulative practices. See 15 U.S.C. S 78n(e) (1976. The SEC has not yet exercised this
authority. See 17 C.F.R. SS 240.14(e)(1)-(3) (1981).
' See infra notes 10-20 and accompanying text (manipulative scheme under 5 10()
generally requires nondisclosure of scheme).
'0 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
" Id. at 476-77.
" See id. at 477. (Santa Fe Court quoted Loss. supra note 8 at 1565, to support position
that manipulation traditionally requires nondisclosure). The term manipulation developed
from an English common law criminal prosecution against a conspiracy to affect stock prices
in the market by false rumors. See id. at 1531-33; Rex v. DeBerenger, 105 Eng. Rep. 536,
536-37 (K.B. 1814) (first English manipulation case).
" 430 U.S. at 476. In Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, the plaintiffs alleged that a major-
ity shareholder violated his fiduciary duty to minority stockholders by entering into a short-
form merger without any legitimate corporate purpose. See id. at 467-68. A short-form merger
is a merger between a parent company and a subsidiary which does not require a vote
of the subsidiary's shareholders. See Freund & Easton, The Three-Piece Suitor: An Alter-
native Approach to Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, 34 Bus. LAW. 1679, 1684 n.26 (1979).
In Santa Fe, however, the Court stated that the short-form merger did not involve any
deception on the part of the majority shareholder. 430 U.S. at 476-77.
" See 430 U.S. at 478 (state law provides adequate remedies for fiduciary violations).
But see infra notes 103-107 and accompanying text (state law gives management wide discre-
tion to act). The Santa Fe Court expressed disapproval over the potential increase in vex-
atious litigation and an expanded class of plaintiffs should federal courts use rule 10b-5
to apply a federal fiduciary principle. 430 U.S. at 479. The Court stated that except for
explicit federal provisions regulating directors' duties to shareholders, the public invests
in corporations on the understanding that state law controls the internal operation of the
corporations. Id. (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1974)). The Santa Fe Court attempted
to end decisions in the lower federal courts recognizing a cause of action under 5 10(b)
based solely on breach of fiduciary duty. See id. at 476-80. See generally Comment, Schoen-
baum v. Firstbrook: The "New Fraud" Expands Federal Corporation Law, 55 VA. L. REv.
1103 (1969) (discussion of initial cases recognizing cause of action under § 10(b) based solely
on breach of fiduciary duty). In one pre-Santa Fe decision, the District Court for the Southern
District of New York found that S 14(e) required target management to uphold a fiduciary
duty to their shareholders. See Applied Digital Data Sys. v. Milgo Electronics, 425 F. Supp.
[Vol. 40:1175
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In addition to the nondisclosure or misrepresentation requirement of
section 10(b), the Supreme Court has held that scienter, an actual intent
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud, must exist to establish an action for
damages under rule 10b-5."5 In 1980, the Supreme Court extended the
scienter requirement to SEC injunctive proceedings for 10b-5 violations.16
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on the necessary elements
for proving a section 14(e) violation during a tender offer, a majority of
federal courts continue to analogize section 14(e) claims to the established
requirements for section 10(b).17 Most bidders seeking permanent injunctive
relief18 against targets' defensive tactics19 during a hostile tender offer
1145, 1156, 1158 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The Milgo court found that the target's sale of unissued
shares to a friendly bidder did not constitute a valid business purpose and was intended
solely to defeat the hostile tender offer. Id. at 1156-58.
15 See Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). In Ernst and Ernst,
the Supreme Court held that negligence was not enough to establish a private cause of
action for damages under rule lOb-5. Id.
11 See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1981). In Aaron, the Supreme Court held that
Congress did not intend to create different scienter standards for private damage actions
and SEC injunctive actions. Id.
" See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text (courts refusing to find S 14(e) viola-
tions for reasons other than nondisclosure). See generally Note, Private Litigation Under
the Williams Act: Standing to Sue, Elements of a Claim and Remedies, 7 J. CORP. L. 545 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Private Litigation] (discussion of necessary elements for implied right
of action under § 14(e)].
" See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977). In Piper, an unsuccessful bidder
claimed damages and sought injunctive relief against the management of the target. Id.
at 9-10. The Supreme Court held that a tender offeror who sued in his capacity as a takeover
bidder, did not have standing to sue for damages under S 14(e). Id. The Piper Court deter-
mined that state law provided the bidder with an adequate remedy for an action based
on the common-law principle of interference with a prospective commercial advantage. Id.
at 40-41; see 1 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS. 949-69 (4th ed. 1971) (common-
law tort of interference with prospective commercial advantage primarily involves use of
unfair or improper competitive practices). Although the Piper Court did not answer the
question of a bidder's standing to sue for injunctive relief under S 14(e), the Court recog-
nized that in the tender offer situation injunctive relief at an early stage of the trial is
probably the best time for granting relief and the most effective type of remedy. See 430
U.S. at 40 n.26, 42, 47 n.33.
A majority of courts after Piper have given bidders standing to sue for injunctive
relief. See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 369-73 (6th Cir. 1981). In Mobil,
the Sixth Circuit explained that providing the bidder standing to sue for injunctive relief
was necessary to protect the interests of the target's shareholders. Id. at 371-72. The Mobil
court stated that the bidder was in the best position to effectuate proper disclosure by
management because the bidder normally will be the only party to have the knowledge
and awareness to identify nondisclosure or manipulative practices in time to obtain
preliminary relief. Id. at 371; see also Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933, 947, 949
(N.D. Ill. 1982); Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294, 300-01 (D. Del. 1981); Weeks
Dredging & Contracting, Inc. v. American Dredging Co., 451 F. Supp. 468, 475-76 (E.D. Pa.
1978); Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp., Inc., 445 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
" See generally Friedenberg, Jaws III: The Impropriety of Shark-Repellent Amendments
as a Takeover Defense, 7 DEL. J. CORP. L. 32 (1982) (discussion of different defensive amend-
ments to corporate charters); Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments: Struc-
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will fail to establish section 14(e) violations if management fully discloses
the tactics to the targets' shareholders, since the Supreme Court has stated
that the primary purpose of the '34 Act is to insure full disclosure." In
1981, however, the Sixth Circuit held in Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.,2
that a managerial defensive tactic constituted a manipulative act in
violation of section 14(e), even though management had fully disclosed the
action to the shareholders.22
In Mobil, Mobil Corporation (Mobil), alleged that two option
agreements between the target, Marathon Oil Company (Marathon), and
a rival bidder, United States Steel Corporation (U.S. Steel), constituted
manipulation in violation of section 14(e).2" The first agreement gave U.S.
Steel an irrevocable option to purchase a significant percentage of
Marathon's unissued shares. '4 The second agreement allowed U.S. Steel
to exercise an option to purchase Marathon's most valuable asset if another
bidder gained control of Marathon.25 The Sixth Circuit found that the two
tural Limitations on the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. REv. 775 (1981-82) (same); Note, Defen-
sive Tactics and the Fiduciary Obligations of the Target Board of Directors, 7 J. CORP. L.
579 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Defensive Tactics] (discussing common types of defensive
tactics), Tender Offer Defensive Tactics, supra note 8 at 633 (same). Management may at-
tempt to use any one of a variety of defensive measures to thwart a hostile tender offer
that threatens takeover of the target company. See id. at 634 n.5 (extensive listing of defen-
sive tactics commonly used by management).
I See infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text (S 14(e) claims should parallel § 10(b)
nondisclosure limitation for fraud); see also Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn [1982-1983 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,043, at 94,954,94,961 (4th Cir. 1983) (citing Piper v. Chris-
Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 26-37 (1977)) (sole purpose of 5 14(e) is to insure adequate
disclosure to shareholders).
2' 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
1 See id. at 373-78. In the district court opinion for Mobil, the District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio held that Santa Fe precluded the bidder's S 14(e) manipulation
claim because the target had fully disclosed the allegedly manipulative agreements. See
Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,375,
at 92,278-22 (S.D. Oh.), rev'd, 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982
(1982).
' 669 F.2d at 368. In Mobil, the district court had temporarily restrained the bidder,
Mobil Corporation (Mobil) from proceeding with its tender offer because the target, Marathon
Oil Co. (Marathon) had filed suit claiming that a proposed merger would violate the
antitrust laws. Id. at 367. During the interim, Marathon sought a friendly bidder or
"white knight" to make an alternative offer to Mobil's bid. Id. Subsequently, the Sixth
Circuit held that a merger between Mobil and Marathon, two large oil corporations,
would probably violate the Clayton Act's prohibition against acquisitions that reduce
competition or tend to create a monopoly. On the basis of the Clayton Act, therefore,
the Sixth Circuit sustained the district court's preliminary injunction against Mobil. See
Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378, 378-84 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 982 (1982).
24 669 F2d at 367.
Id. The valuable asset involved in Mobil was Marathon's 48% interest in the Yates
oil field, one of the nation's most productive oil and gas fields. Id. at 367-68.
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"lockup" options28 created an artificialF ceiling for the value of Marathon's
stock by discouraging competitive bidding for Mobil's stock." The Mobil
court determined that the purpose of the Williams Act, protection of the
target's shareholders, required that all bidders have the opportunity to
equally compete for the target's shares.29 The court stated that Mobil,
the original bidder, was willing to make a higher bid than U.S. Steel if
the court invalidated the options." The court held that the options, by
locking up major assets of Marathon, were section 14(e) manipulative
practices that had discouraged further competitive bidding?'
The Mobil court's interpretation of section 14(e) manipulation has been
criticized for several reasons for not paralleling the requirements of section
10(b).12 First, critics contend that by finding a fully disclosed agreement
See Fraidin & Franco, Lock-up Arrangements, REV. SEC. REG. Vol. 14 at 821 (Nov. 4,
1981). A lockup agreement gives the prospective acquirer of a target an advantage over
other bidders or potential bidders by excluding valuable assets of the target from acquisi-
tion by a hostile bidder. Id.
I" See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 463, 476 (1977). The Santa Fe Court
used the term "artificial" in describing manipulative practices that interfere with the natural
flow of supply and demand in the marketplace, or in other words, practices that affect a
stock's price. Id. The Court referred to price rigging, a practice that raises the price of
a stock through a series of pretended purchases to create the impression of an unusual
demand for the stock, as one example of a manipulative practice that has an artificial effect
on the stock's price. Id.; see Loss, supra note 8, at 1541-69 (reviewing specifically prohibited
manipulative practices under '34 Act).
28 669 F.2d at 374-77. The Mobil court explained that the definition of manipulation
must remain flexible in order to include new techniques which artificially affect -securities
markets, and quoted Santa Fe in support of this position. Id. at 374 (quoting Santa Fe In-
dustries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977)). The Mobil court observed that lockup op-
tions were a relatively new defensive tactic used to combat takeovers and represented
the kind of manipulative device that Congress meant to prohibit under the securities laws.
669 F.2d at 374.
1 669 F.2d at 376. The Mobil court dismissed Marathon's argument that the Santa
Fe requirements only demand full disclosure under § 14(e) and nothing more.Jd. The Mobil
court observed that the Santa Fe decision only concerned § 10(b). Id. The Sixth Circuit,
furthermore, found that Marathon construed the Santa Fe holding too broadly because Santa
Fe did not hold that nondisclosure was the only basis for bringing a S 10(b) claim.Id. Although
the Mobil court recognized the Santa Fe statement that nondisclosure is usually necessary
for a manipulative scheme to succeed, the Mobil court stated that cases will occur in which
the manipulative act is not cured by disclosure. Id.
IId. at 376-77. In the Mobil case, Mobil originally offered to buy 40 million shares
of Marathon's outstanding common stock for $85 a share. Id. at 367. U.S. Steel then offered
to purchase 30 million shares of Marathon common stock for $125 per share. Id. Mobil
countered with an offer to buy at least 30 million shares of Marathon stock for $126 per
share, conditioned on a finding that the two lockup options were invalid. Id. at 369.
31 Id. at 377.
See infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text (discussion of criticism of Mobil holding);
Note, Developments in Corporate Takeover Techniques: Creeping Tender Offers, Lockup Ar-
rangements, and Standstill Agreements, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1095,1114 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Corporate Takeover Techniques] (denying management opportunity to negotiate lockup
1983] 1179
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manipulative, the Mobil court improperly expanded the definition of
manipulation33 and violated the Santa Fe Court's prohibition against
examining the fairness of an agreement under federal securities law.'
Second, critics argue that the Mobil holding improperly expanded the
definition of manipulation under the '34 Act by including managerial
conduct outside the market that influences the market.' Third, critics claim
that the Mobil court ignored the scienter requirement for a cause of action
under the '34 Act. Finally, critics are concerned that federal courts might
extend Mobil's analysis to all defensive tactics initiated by management
during a hostile tender offer, even though management may have
legitimate reasons for opposing a particular bidder. 7
Although the Mobil court's interpretation of section 14(e) manipula-
tion expands the definition of manipulation under section 10(b), 8 limited
may limit shareholder choice); Tender Offer Defensive Tactics, supra note 8 at 650-53 (Mobil
court violated Santa Fe rule prohibiting federal fiduciary standard).
Se6 Tender Offer Defensive Tactics, supra note 8, at 650-51. The writer argues that
the Mobil court ignored the Santa Fe ruling that manipulation traditionally does not in-
clude acts fully disclosed to investors. Id.; see Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,
477 (1977) (nondisclosure usually necessary for manipulative scheme to succeed).
See Tender Offer Defensive Tactics, supra note 8, at 647, 652-53 (Santa Fe Court re-
jected federal fiduciary standard). The writer contends that the congressional history of
the Williams Act indicates only that Congress intended to eliminate pressured, uninformed
decisions by target shareholders during a tender offer by a requirement of full and fair
disclousure. Id. at 652. Further, the writer states that the legislative history does not give
any indication that Congress intended to give bidders an absolute right to bid for another
corporation or to insure that investors get the highest possible bid for their shares. Id.
at 652, 653. But see infra note 41 and accompanying text (limited congressional evidence
exists supporting competitive bidding).
See Tender Offer Defensive Tactics, supra note 8, at 640, 650-51. The writer argues
that under the '34 Act, conduct outside the market that influences the market is not ar-
tificial within the meaning of manipulation. Id. at 639, 650. The argument is based on the
holding in a 1979 federal district case that the definition of manipulation under § 10(b) does
not including acts originating outside the marketplace. Id. at 640 nn..37 & 38; see Hundahl
v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1360 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (manipulation con-
sists of practices in marketplace that actually tamper with security's price or create false
impression that market activity is occurring). But see Loss, supra note 8, at 1537-38 (New
York penal law prohibits any person from knowingly circulating any false statement, rumor,
or intelligence that may affect market price of a security).
I See Tender Offer Defensive Tactics, supra note 8, at 650. The writer argues that the
Mobil court, by finding that Marathon had disclosed fully the option agreements to its
shareholders, ignored the Supreme Court requirement that an actual intent to deceive or
mislead exist for a cause of action under the '34 Act. See id. But see infra notes 49-50 and
accompanying text (plaintiff can prove intent to manipulate under Mobil analysis).
I See Tender Offer Defensive Tactic, supra note 8, at 650 (Mobil analysis could extend
to any defensive tactic that deters competitive bidding or creates artificial ceiling for share's
value); Corporate Takeover Techniques, supra note 32, at 1114 (Mobil holding may have far
reaching effects if extended to all lockup agreements). But see infra notes 55-58 and accom-
panying text (courts are reluctant to extend Mobil holding).
I See supra text accompanying notes 10-16 (requirements for cause of action under
S 10(b)); 669 F.2d at 373-76 (Mobil court's interpretation of S 14(e) manipulation).
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evidence exists that courts should draw a distinction. 9 Legislative history
indicates that Congress intended the Williams Act to protect shareholders
through disclosure, but did not intend the Act to provide the bidder or
the target company with an advantage during a hostile tender offer.0 Some
members of Congress who supported the bill, however, considered com-
petitive bidding for a block of target stock beneficial because competition
increases the premium that shareholders receive for tendering their
shares.4" A managerial defensive tactic that frustrates competitive bid-
" See infra notes 40-54 and accompanying text (discussion of arguments supporting
Mobil distinction).
40 See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1977) (Williams Act is designed
to avoid favoring bidder or target) (citing 113 CONG. REC. 24664 (1967) (remarks of Sen.
Williams)). The Piper Court stated that the sole purpose of the Williams Act was the pro-
tection of investors confronted with a tender offer. 430 U.S. at 35. In the Senate debates
on the bill, however, Senator Williams stated that "the purpose of the bill is to require
full and fair disclosure for the benefit of stockholders while at the same time providing
the offeror and management equal opportunity to fairly present their case." 113 CONG. REC.
854, 855 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams). At least two commentators argue that the Piper
Court erroneously neglected the Williams Act's policy of evenhandedness and neutrality
toward the bidder and management by placing undue emphasis on protection of investors
as the sole purpose of the Act. See 430 U.S. at 29, 35; Pitt, Standing to Sue Under the Williams
Act after Chris-Craft: A Leaky Ship on Troubled Waters, 34 Bus. LAw. 117, 166-67 (1978);
Private Litigation, supra note 17, at 548 n.32. Justice Stevens, dissenting in Piper, stated
that the legislative history indicated that the Act clearly was not meant to favor manage-
ment. 430 U.S. at 63 n.16 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The bill originally introduced into Con-
gress had been avowedly pro-management, but intense criticism forced the proponents to
revise the bill to avoid favoring either side. See id. at 30.
'" See 113 CONG. REc. 24665, 24666 (1967) (remarks of Senator Javits). Senator Javits
stated that shareholders derive an obvious benefit from tender offers, particularly com-
peting tender offers for a block of stock, namely the opportunity to sell shares for a premium
over their market price. See id. But see H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 1, at 2821. The report
states that § 14(e) affirms the fact that anyone seeking to influence the decision of investors
or the outcome of a tender offer is under an obligation to make full disclosure of material
information. Id. This statement may indicate that Congress only intended S 14(e) to per-
form the equivalent function of 5 10(b), and therefore, did not contemplate the use of S
14(e) to prohibit fully disclosed acts that deter competitive bidding. See id.
See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2636 n.9 (1982). In Mite, the Supreme Court
referred to Senator Javits' remarks in the legislative history while holding that an Illinois
takeover statute was invalid under the commerce clause. See id. at 2636 n.9, 2640-41. The
Mite decision represents a victory for bidders against state legislation that clearly intended
to provide target management more time to defend against hostile bidders. See id. at 2635-43.
The Mite decision, however, does not support the proposition that federal courts should
take affirmative action under S 14(e) to prevent defensive efforts by target management
during hostile tender offers. See id. at 2643, 2648.
Although six justices concurred in Mite that the Illinois Act was invalid under the
commerce clause, only three of those justices agreed that the Williams Act preempted the
state statute because the state statute violated the Williams Act's express policy of main-
taining a balance between the combatants. See id. at 2635-40. The three justices concurring
on the preemption ground agreed that the Act, by allowing the state to pass on the substan-
tive fairness of a tender offer, interferred with congressional desire to provide shareholders
complete freedom to make their own choice after full disclosure. See id. at 2639. Two justices,
however, who concurred solely on the commerce clause ground, argued that the Williams
1983] 1181
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ding reduces the premium for tendering shareholders and arguably con-
stitutes a manipulative act prohibited under the policy of the Williams
Act.42
Another argument supporting a different interpretation of section 14(e)
manipulation from section 10(b) manipulation is that the tender offer
developed many years after the original congressional investigation into
manipulative practices in the securities market.43 In addition, the develop-
ment of lockups and other agreements that frustrate competitive bidding
has occurred since the passage of the Williams Act.' Thus, a requirement
that section 14(e) manipulation apply only to conduct inside the market
eliminates the effectiveness of a manipulative act prohibition in the tender
Act's neutrality policy does not necessarily prohibit state legislation designed to insure
greater protection to interests that include but often are broader than the interests of
management. See id. at 2643 (Powell, J., concurring in part); id. at 2648 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part).
2 See supra text accompanying note 31 (Marathon's lockup options precluded higher
bids). But see Corporate Takeover Techniques, supra note 32, at 1114. Several commentators
argue that if courts' deny target management the opportunity to negotiate a stock or asset
agreement with a white knight, courts may actually limit rather than expand shareholder
choice. See id.; Bialkin, Court Costs Cloud Over Option Tactic in Take-overs, Legal Times
of Wash., Jan. 11, 1982, at 19. The rationale for the argument is that if management is
not allowed to negotiate lockup agreements or a bidder is not allowed to pressure a target
into making concessions for a higher bid, then no higher bids will result, and shareholders
can only tender at the original bidder's price. See Corporate Takeover Techniques, supra
note 32, at 1114. Although the argument may have merit for some targets that have received
no offers other than the original bid, the argument does not appear to apply under the
facts in Mobil. See 669 F.2d at 367-68, 375-76.
In Mobil, the white knight, U.S. Steel, apparently pressured Marathon's management
into accepting U.S. Steel's conditional bid. See id. at 367. The Mobil court observed that
two other large companies had expressed an interest in bidding for Marathon, but only
if the companies received options to purchase Marathon's interest in the Yates oil field.
See id. at 367-68. Thus, Marathon's management apparently was unable to secure a higher
bid than Mobil's bid unless Marathon gave the competing bidder a lockup option. See id.
In Mobil, however, Marathon's management admitted in testimony that the 10 million share
stock option granted to U.S. Steel would act as a deterrent against higher bids not only
by Mobil, but by other third parties. See id. at 376. Marathon's admitted deterrence motive
suggests that Marathon's directors were less concerned with finding alternative competitive
bidders than with arranging an agreement that would deter Mobil's bid altogether. See
id. By granting a lockup provision during a hostile tender offer, management advances
one step beyond merely soliciting competitive bids to actually discouraging the hostile bid-
der from making a high'r bid. See id. at 373-78. But see Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp.
[1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,079, at 95,131, 95,140-41 (W.D.N.Y.
1983) (sale of treasury stock during bidding contest did not constitute S 14(e) manipulation
because sales stimulated rather than foreclosed competitive bidding).
" See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 64-68 (1973)
(discussion of rise and development of tender offers and subsequent proposals for regula-
tion in 1960s). In 1960 there were only eight cash tender offers involving companies with
securities listed on national securities exchanges as compared to 107 in 1966. Id. at 65 n.3.
" See 669 F.2d at 374; Tender Offer Defensive Tactics, supra note 8, at 648 n.91 (lockup
agreement is relatively new type of defensive tactic).
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offer context. 5 Section 14(e) manipulation should include any action that
affects the price of a share in a tender offer transaction, regardless of
where the action takes place, if that action frustrates competitive bidding.
4
The Mobil court's approach to section 14(e) manipulation, if strictly
applied to actions that frustrate competitive bidding, can satisfy a scienter
requirement47 and avoid an inquiry into managerial motives or the fairness
of the transaction.48 An agreement deterring a competitive bidding that
management fully discloses to the shareholders evidences management's
awareness of the agreement's anticompetitive effect.49 A court should find
an actual intent to manipulate, therefore, if manipulation covers
agreements that foreclose competitive bidding. 0 In addition, under the
Mobil court's application of section 14(e), management cannot justify
manipulation by good faith performance of management's fiduciary
obligations.-' The Mobil court's approach, however, does not interfere with
managerial discretion to oppose a bidder for control of the target com-
pany when legitimate business reasons exist.' Management also may enlist
"5 See 669 F.2d at 374, 377 (term manipulative must remain flexible in face of new
techniques which artificially affect securities market); Loss. supra note 8, at 1531-38
(manipulation concept developed from English criminal prosecution for false rumors out-
side marketplace concerning death of Napoleon intended to raise stock prices on London
Stock Exchange).
6 See supra notes 21-31 and accompanying text (Mobil court found that lockup provi-
sions placed artificial cap on price of target's shares).
" See supra text accompanying notes 15-16 (Supreme Court requires actual intent to
deceive or defraud for violations under rule 10b-5); infra text accompanying notes 49-50
(fully disclosed agreement indicates management's intent).
" See infra notes 51 & 99-100 and accompanying text (Mobil court did not dispute target
management's good faith in finding violation of S 14(e)).
" See 669 F.2d at 376 (management testimony regarding impact of lockup option in-
dicating managements knowledge of agreement's anticompetitive effect); supra note 42 (same).
Under a usual manipulative scheme that requires nondisclosure for success, an intent to
deceive may be difficult to prove. Under the Mobil analysis, however, a lockup agreement
already disclosed to the shareholders in effect eliminates the need to prove scienter if the
agreement is per se illegal. See Loss. supra note 8, at 1565 n.145. In a 1958 SEC proceeding
against a traditional form of manipulation, the SEC found that although the defendants
had disclosed their intention to manipulate the market to push the stock price up, the defen-
dants had violated fraud provisions of the '34 Act in failing to disclose that the action would
be illegal. Id.; see Shelley, Roberts & Co. of Cal., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. 5837 (1958) at 8; see
also 669 F.2d at 377 (Mobil court's position that restricting manipulation to undisclosed acts
would render manipulation prohibition useless in tender offer context). But see Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) (Supreme Court stated that manipulation under
§ 10(b) means willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investor by controlling or ar-
tificially affecting stock's price).
I See supra note 49 (lockup agreement that is disclosed to shareholders and also
forecloses bidding indicates management's knowledge of agreement's deterrent effect).
0! 669 F.2d at 372; see infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text (Mobil court did not
disturb lower court's finding of good faith and loyalty on part of Marathon's management).
I See 669 F.2d at 373-77. The Mobil analysis does not forbid management from taking
defensive measures that will maintain the corporate entity as long as such tactics do not
constitute manipulation in connection with the hostile tender offer. See id.; see also Buffalo
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friendly bidders, known as "white knights," to raise the bid for the target's
shares. 3 Management, however, should not take unilateral action that
frustrates the shareholders' right to tender their shares to the highest
bidder.'
Despite the fears of critics, federal courts have not applied the Mobil
court's analysis to all defense tactics and effectively precluded managerial
action against hostile tender offers. 5 In cases after Mobil, courts have
either regarded section 14(e) manipulation claims with skepticism or
avoided making determinations on the claims because the plaintiffs fail
to satisfy the requirements for equitable relief.' These decisions indicate
Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp. [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,079, at
95,131, 95,140-41 (W.D.N.Y. 1983). In Buffalo Forge, a successful bidder who subsequently
gained control of the target alleged that an agreement entered into between the target
and a rival bidder during the bidding contest constituted a manipulative lockup device in
violation of S 14(e). See id. at 95,132. The agreement allowed the rival bidder to purchase
most of the target's unissued treasury stock with a promissory note payable over 10 years
and also provided the rival with a one-year option to purchase the remaining treasury shares.
See id. at 95,135-37. The District Court for the Western District of New York found that
the agreement did not constitute manipulation under S 14(e) because unlike the situation
in Mobil, neither the bidder nor the target in Buffalo Forge intended the sale of treasury
stock or the option to foreclose higher bids. Id. at 95,141. The court observed that the agree-
ment actually stimulated rather than foreclosed competitive bidding. Id. Although the suc-
cessful bidder may have continued to raise the offer for the target's stock on the belief
that a court would later invalidate the sale of treasury stock, the fact remains that the
announcement of the sale did not deter competitive bidding but led to three successive,
increased bids. See id. at 95,137-38. The agreement in Buffalo Forge, unlike the agreement
in Mobil, did not include an irrevocable option to purchase the target's most valuable asset.
See id.
' See 669 F.2d at 373-78. The Mobil court did not object to Marathon's efforts to enlist
a white knight. See id. The Mobil court objected to Marathon's agreements with U.S. Steel
that effectively stifled other competitive bids. Id.
I See id. at 376-77. An unstated but implicit reason for the Sixth Circuit's holding
in Mobil was the complete absence of shareholder participation in the decision. See id.; see
also infra text accompanying notes 85-86 (unilateral action by management more easily
characterized as manipulative). See generally Bebchuk, The Case For Facilitating Competing
Tender Offers, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1028 (1982). Bebchuk endorses regulations providing time
for competing bids and supports a rule allowing management to solicit competing bids so
long as management does not obstruct the initial, or any subsequent tender offer. See id.
See infra notes 56-57 (review of holdings that did not extend Mobil S 14(e) analysis).
A majority of cases after Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green have held that when adequate
disclosure is made, no action will lie under S 14(e) for the use of defensive tactics during
a tender offer. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 283 (7th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1982); Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 551 (1980); Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1318 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
But see Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Abrams, 510 F. Supp. 860, 861-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(court issued temporary restraining order until hearing could determine whether target
management had used manipulative practices by opposing tender offer without business
justification).
I See Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn [1982-83 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,043,
at 94,962 n.10 (4th Cir. 1983); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn [1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,616, at 93,057, 93,061 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
1, See FMC Corp. v. R.P. Scherer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 318, 319-23 (D. Del. 1982) (court
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that the Mobil decision, if extended at all, may only limit the use of a
small category of defensive tactics. 8 Mobil's limited acceptance, however,
has not deterred plaintiffs from attempting to extend the Mobil analysis
to a variety of situations,59 including claims by management that some
hostile tender offers are manipulative under section 14(e)." Delays caus-
ed by litigation are one of the most effective weapons against a tender
offer because of market changes, rising costs for the bidder, and the op-
portunity that management can initiate other defenses during the delay. 1
Courts, therefore, have struggled to assess the merits of the various claims
for injunctive relief before delay forces a bidder to terminate an offer.2
In two recent decisions, bidders have attempted to extend Mobil's sec-
tion 14(e) manipulation analysis to defensive tactics other than lockup op-
tion agreements. 3 In FMC Corp. v. R.P. Scherer Corp.,64 the bidder, FMC
Corporation (FMC) sought a preliminary injunction to block a vote by the
shareholders of R.P. Scherer Corporation (Scherer), the target company,
on three amendments to Scherer's certification of incorporation. 5 The
amendments included a supermajority68 proposal that would require the
found speculation on § 14(e) claim unnecessary because plaintiff failed to show likelihood
of irreparable harm); San Francisco Real Estate Investors v. REIT of America [1982 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,874, at 94,554-57 (D. Mass. 1982) (court found no 5 14(e)
violation by trustees who acted in good faith in opposing tender offer); Whittaker Corp.
v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933, 947-49 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Although the district court in Edgar
agreed with the Mobil § 14(e) analysis regarding options, the court found that the outright
sale of a subsidiary by the target during a hostile tender offer does not create an artificial
price ceiling in the tender offer market for the target's shares. See id. at 949. The Edgar
court stated that the sale of the subsidiary cannot be construed as expressly designed solely
for the purpose of blocking competitive bidding, quoting this language from Mobil. See id.;
669 F.2d at 374; see also supra note 52 (discussion of recent court holding that sale of treasury
stock and option agreed to during hostile tender offer were not manipulative practices under
14(e)).
' See infra text accompanying notes 79-96 (discussion of recent decisions that did not
extend Mobil § 14(e) analysis to other defensive tactics).
' See infra text accompanying notes 63-90 (discussion of cases in which plaintiffs alleged
that bylaw and charter amendments were manipulative under S 14(e)).
' See infra text accompanying notes 117-49 (target management alleges tender offers
are manipulative under S 14(e)).
"l Defensive Tactics, supra note 19 at 588-89. See Edgar v. Mite, 102 S. Ct. 2639 n.12
(1983) (SEC listing of defenses target can pursue during delay). The Supreme Court in Mite
recognized that delay can seriously impede a tender offer. See id. at 2629, 2638, 2638 n.12.
See generally Wachtell, Special Tender Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 Bus. LAW. 1433 (1977)
(discussion of advantages that management receives by litigating).
" See supra text accompanying note 61 (reasons why litigation is effective weapon
against tender offer).
I See infra text accompanying notes 64-90 (bidders allege bylaw and charter amend-
ments are manipulative under § 14(e)).
545 F. Supp. 318 (D. Del. 1982).
Id. at 319.
See Friedenberg, supra note 19, at 42-44. A supermajority proposal is a preventive
defensive tactic that requires a certain percentage of the shareholders beyond a mere ma-
jority to approve business mergers that have not been agreed to by the board of directors.
See Defensive Tactics, supra note 19, at 586. The tactic is preventive in nature because a
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approval of eighty percent of the stockholders before Scherer could merge
with another company." Another amendment proposed the creation of a
group of continuing directors68 who would have discretion to waive the
eighty percent requirement and permit a proposed merger by a majority
of the shareholders. 9 FMC alleged that the proposed amendments con-
stituted deceptive and manipulative acts in violation of section 14(e)
because the amendments would deter competitive bidding for Scherer's
stock by preventing a takeover by a hostile bidder."0
The United States District Court for the District of Delaware denied
FMC's claim for equitable relief because of FMC's failure to satisfy the
necessary requirements for obtaining a preliminary injunction.' Although
FMC asserted that adoption of the corporate charter amendments would
leave FMC with a large and costly 2 block of Scherer stock and no damage
remedy for frustration of FMC's merger plans, the Scherer court rejected
supermajority requirement to approve business mergers may discourage a bid from ever
being made. Id. Between 1972 and 1978, 199 companies listed on the New York Stock Ex-
change adopted supermajority provisions of one type or another. See Black & Smith, Anti-
takeover Charter Provisions: Defeating Self-Help for Takeover Targets, 36 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 699, 713 n.51 (1979).
545 F. Supp. at 319.
' See Friedenberg, supra note 19, at 3942. Continuing directors are directors who
would remain in office indefinitely, or under a staggered system, directors who would re-
main on the board longer than the original term of office provided for in the corporate
charter. See id.
5 45 F. Supp. at 319. In FMC Corp. v. R.P. Scherer Corp., the bidder, FMC, alleged
that the shareholders behind Scherer's management controlled almost 48% of Scherer's
common stock and that approval of the amendments would allow Scherer's management
to preclude FMC's offer. Id at 320. FMC also alleged that an option agreement entered
into by Scherer and Deutsche Gelatine Fabriken Stoess & Co. (DGF) for a valuable West
German subsidiary of Scherer, constituted a manipulative device in conjunction with the
supermajority proposal by absolutely deterring any hostile tender offer. Id. at 319 n.2.
Although FMC used the Mobil argument that the DGF option and the amendments imposed
an artificial ceiling on the market price for Scherer stock by deterring competitive bidding,
the Scherer court never addressed the issue. Id. at 321-23; see infra text accompanying notes
71-73 (Scherer court based decision on FMC's failure to show irreparable harm). Scherer
had entered into the DGF option in 1979, three years before the initiation of FMC's tender
offer. 545 F. Supp. at 321. A court, therefore, probably would not find the DGF option a
manipulative act under S 14(e) because the agreement dearly had not taken place "in con-
nection with" a tender offer. See infra text accompanying notes 92-94 (S 14(e) requires
manipulation occur in connection with tender offer).
,0 545 F. Supp. at 319. In addition to the S 14(e) manipulation claim FMC asserted
in Scherer, FMC also asserted that the proxy materials on the proposed amendments con-
tained materially false and misleading statements in violation of S 14(a) of the '34 Act. Id.
11 Id. at 321-23. To obtain a preliminary injunction under federal law, a plaintiff must
demonstrate a probability of irreparable injury, and a reasonable probability of success
on the merits. Id. at 321. A court, in making a determination on the request, must consider
the possibility of harm to the other party if relief is granted, and the public interest to
be served by providing or denying relief. Id.
71 See id. at 322. In Scherer, FMC stated that the price FMC was willing to pay for
the stock was 90% over the market value. Id.
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the likelihood of irreparable harm should FMC continue with the offer
after approval of the amendments."3 The court stated that an adequate
remedy at law would exist for FMC if the court later found that Scherer's
defensive amendments illegally obstructed FMC's merger plans. 4 The
district court explained that the court had the power to vacate the
shareholders' vote and order a second vote if the court later held the
amendments invalid.'
The Scherer court observed that FMC had conditioned its tender of-
fer with a right to terminate the offer should Sherer's stockholders adopt
the amendments. 6 The court stated that FMC's primary reason for seek-
ing a preliminary injunction was to obtain an initial indication of the legal-
ity of the supermajority amendment and the prospect of ultimately merg-
ing with Scherer before financially committing itself to the tender offer.
7
The court determined that FMC's position clearly did not warrant the
court disclosing any preliminary indication as to FMC's ultimate success
on the merits.
78
Although the Scherer court refused to speculate on the validity of
FMC's amendments, the prospect appears unlikely that federal courts will
ever find supermajority or similar defensive amendments manipulative
under section 14(e).7 1 Under the Mobil analysis, a manipulation claim
assumes that a managerial defensive tactic not only frustrates competitive
bidding but also prevents a majority of shareholders from tendering their
" Id. at 321-22. In Scherer, several shareholders of Scherer intervened in the case
against Scherer's management under an allegation of irreparable harm should Scherer adopt
the supermajority proposal. Id. at 322-23. The shareholders argued that if the amendments
were adopted the shareholders would suffer in the short run because FMC would abandon
its offer, and in the long run because the supermajority amendment would depress the
market value of their stock and discourage other potential bidders. Id. at 322. The Scherer
court found that the intervenors would have an adequate remedy at law, a post-transaction
suit for damages against Scherer if the court later declared the amendments invalid and
FMC abandoned its offer. Id. The court disregarded the intervenors contention regarding
loss of possible future bids as too speculative to constitute immediate irreparable harm.
Id. at 323.
U Id. at 322.
1 Id The Scherer court distinguished the situation in which a court erroneously refused
to preliminarily enjoin a merger from the situation in Scherer. See id. at 323. The court
stated that the reason courts grant preliminary relief more willingly to prevent a merger
rather than to prevent tactics obstructing a merger is the difficulty of "unscrambling the
eggs" after an erroneous refusal to enjoin a merger. Id.
' Id. Most tender offers include conditions making acceptance of the tender offer uncer-
tain. See 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER. TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS, S 1.7.11 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as LIPTON & STEINBERGER].
" 545 F. Supp. at 323.
78 Id.
" See infra text accompanying notes 80-84 (corporate charter amendments require
shareholder participation). But see generally Gilson, supra note 19 (antitakeover amendments
are in direct conflict with allocation of authority between shareholders and management
under modern corporate structure).
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shares of a premium.' Corporate charter amendments, by preventing a
bidder from gaining control of the target after a successful offer, may
force the removal of the bid altogether." By requiring a majority vote
of the shareholders, however, a supermajority amendment does not con-
stitute unilateral action by management.2 If management fully discloses
the purpose and effects of the amendment to the shareholders,' the amend-
ment should not violate any provisions of the Williams Act.'
In contrast to corporate charter amendments, limitations in corporate
bylaws usually do not require a shareholder vote in order to become
effective." Thus, for purposes of a section 14(e) claim, unilateral action
by management to amend a bylaw is more easily characterized as
manipulative if the bylaw's effect is to thwart a tender offer." In San
Francisco Real Estate Investors v. REIT of America,l' however, the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied a bidder
a preliminary injunction because the bidder ultimately could not prove
that a bylaw limitation, restricting the concentration of stock in the target
company, constituted a manipulative device under section 14(e).' The REIT
I See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 373-77 (6th Cir. 1981); supra text
accompanying notes 39-54 (discussion of support for Mobil position that 5 14(e) should pro-
tect shareholders' right to tender to highest bidder).
", See supra note 66 (some corporate charter amendments designed as preventive defen-
sive tactic).
n See supra text accompanying notes 64-75 (amendments to corporate charter require
shareholder participation).
1 See supra text accompanying note 14-15 (federal securities law primarily requires
full disclosure).
' See supra note 66 (supermajority amendment usually requires majority shareholder
vote in order to take effect).
" See Friedenberg, supra note 19, at 34 n.15, 49, 49 n.96 (bylaw amendments are less
common and less safe than charter amendments). Depending on the substantive requirements
under each state's corporation laws and under each corporation's charter, directors will
have some power to amend the corporation's bylaws without the necessity of a shareholder
vote. See id. at 34, 49.
' See id. at 49, 49 n.96. Some antitakeover actions may be illegal under state corpora-
tion law. See id. at 50-51; see also Telvest v. Olson, No. 5798 (Del. Ch. filed March 8, 1979).
In Telvest, a Delaware court held that directors who attempted to unilaterally reduce the
voting rights for common stock by issuing an unusual class of preferred stock to prevent
a takeover violated the shareholders' right to vote under state law. See Friedenberg, supra
note 19, at 50-51; see also Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294 (D. Del. 1981) (substan-
tial likelihood of fiduciary breach by directors repurchasing company stock during tender
offer). But see infra notes 103-07 and accompanying text (majority of courts favor defensive
tactics by management under business judgment rule).
, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,874, at 94,551 (D. Mass. 1982).
" See San Francisco Real Estate Investors v. REIT of America [1982 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,874, at 94,555. The bylaw limitation in REIT restricted any
shareholder from purchasing more than 9.8/o of the trust's stock. See id. at 94,554. The
bylaw at issue in REIT was very similar to the bylaw adopted in Pacific Realty Trust v.
APC Investments, Inc., 685 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1982). See infra text accompanying
notes 118-34 (discussion of Pacific Realty). The REIT district court, however, distinguished
the two cases because the bylaw in Pacific Realty had been enacted after a tender offer
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court stated that in order to establish a claim of manipulation under sec-
tion 14(e), a bidder must show that management enacted the bylaw solely
to prevent the tender offer. 9 The court found that the trustees, the
managers of the target company, acted in good faith by enacting the stock
ownership bylaw because a concentration in stock might result in the
target company losing a special tax advantage under the Internal Revenue
Code.9
The REIT court's holding raises several questions when a bidder at-
tempts to classify a target bylaw limitation as manipulative under sec-
tion 14(e).9' Because section 14(e) requires that the manipulation occur in
connection with a tender offer,' if a company passes a bylaw before receiv-
ing a tender offer, the company refutes a connection between the two
actions and the bylaw should not violate section 14(e).1 Management with
foresight to anticipate a tender offer can take defensive measures with
little fear that such measures will later constitute manipulative acts,
despite the fact that management's sole concern in enacting the restric-
tive bylaw limitations is to prevent future hostile tender offers.94 A court
had commenced. [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,874, at 94,555. The district
court indicated that the bylaw in REIT had been enacted before the commencement of
the tender offer. See id. at 94,554, 94,556 (bylaw enacted 7 *days before filing for tender
offer). But see infra note 90 (court opinion confusing regarding liability of target under S
14(e) "in connection with" tender offer language).
[1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,874, at 94,555. See infra text ac-
companying notes 98-101 (REIT court's consideration of management's good faith for deter-
mining S 14(e) violation is contrary to Mobl analysis and reduces inquiry to breach of fiduciary
obligation).
See [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CH) 98,874, at 94,555. Although the
REIT court refused the bidder's preliminary injunction request, the court denied the target
trustee's motion to dismiss. See i& at 94,557. The district court referred to the phrase,
"in connection with a tender offer,' under S 14(d), in determining that on the basis of the
preliminary evidence the bidder had demonstrated that the trustees' action was taken to
meet a perceived tender offer. See id. The court stated that the phrase "in connection with
a tender offer" should not be read so narrowly if the purposes of the Williams Act are
to be achieved. Id. Although the REIT court mentioned § 14(d) as containing the "in connec-
tion with" phrase, the court presumably meant 5 14(e) because 5 14(d) does not contain
the phrase "in connection with." See id.; 15 U.S.C. S 78n(d) (1976). Considering the district
court's earlier finding that S 14(e) probably had not been violated because of the trustees'
legitimate purpose for passing the bylaw, the RE!T court's rationale for refusing to dismiss
the case is difficult to understand. See [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,874,
at 94,555, 94,557.
'I See infra text accompanyng notes 92-101 (court must determine that manipulation
occurred in connection with tender offer under § 14(e) and should not consider manage-
ment's good faith).
See 15 U.S.C. 5 78(e) (1976) (§ 14(e) applies to actions taken in connection with any
tender offer).
See [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,874, at 94,555 (bylaw passed
before initiation of tender offer not unauthorized). But see id. at 94,557 (bylaw passed 7
days before filing for tender offer may violate "in connection with tender offer" prohibition).
I See supra note 66 (significant number of public corporations have passed superma-
jority provisions). But see Gilson, supra note 19, at 792-804 (author contends that direct
deterrent effect of antitakeover amendments against tender offers has been exaggerated).
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is more likely to find manipulation in restrictive bylaws passed by manage-
ment during the course of a tender offer, even if management passed the
bylaws for a legitimate corporate purpose.95 Additionally, most target
management groups will not have as persuasive an argument as the
trustees that opposed the tender offer in REIT.98
The REIT court raised a more difficult question by deciding the sec-
tion 14(e) claim on the basis of the trustees' good faith." By considering
management's purpose for enacting the bylaw limitation, the REIT court
ignored the prohibition in Sante Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green against a
federal court's inquiry into management's fiduciary obligations under
federal securities laws. 8 Furthermore, the REIT court, by considering the
trustees' good faith, neglected an important statement by the Mobil court,
that manipulation cannot be justified by good faith performance of fiduciary
duties.9 In Mobil, the Sixth Circuit stated that the decision to find section
14(e) manipulation did not disturb the district court's finding of good faith
on the part of the target's management. 9 The Mobil court focused on
the lockup options' effect on competitive bidding, not on the purpose of
the options and, therefore, the court's ruling did not contradict the Santa
Fe prohibition.'
9' See supra notes 88 & 90 (REIT court's position on legitimate bylaw passed in con-
nection with tender offer). But see supra note 55 (majority of federal courts do not find
manipulation under § 14(e) if action is fully disclosed to shareholders).
See [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,874, at 94,555 (trustees had
obligation to act to preserve tax status of target).
17 See id. (trustees acted in good faith).
"' See supra text accompanying notes 13-14 & 34 (Santa Fe holding forbids inquiry
under federal securities law into management's good faith).
" See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 372 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 982 (1982).
See id. at 377.
,o, See id. at 373-77 (lockup options effectively deter other competitive bids). In Mobil,
the Sixth Circuit referred to language in S 14(e) prohibiting manipulation by "any person"
in connection with a tender offer. Id. Although the Sixth Circuit implied that U.S. Steel
was responsible for the manipulative conduct by demanding and obtaining the options, the
Mobil court stated that the Williams Act prohibited the options regardless of which party
did the manipulating. Id. The Mobil court's analysis focused on the effect of the options,
and the court would prohibit any similar agreement enacted in connection with a tender
offer. See id.
Although the Sixth Circuit stated that by blocking competitive bidding the options
could be interpreted as designed solely for that purpose, the court's analysis carefully avoided
an inquiry into management's reasons for entering into the agreements. See id. at 374, 375-77.
At least one commentator has suggested an approach that would consider management's
purpose. See Loss, supra note 8, at 1552-53. Under an approach considering management's
purpose, the existence of a motive to manipulate establishes the manipulative purpose and
the burden of going forward with the evidence will then shift to management. See id. Under
a management purpose approach, however, a motive to manipulate will exist in every hostile
tender offer situation because of the potential conflict of interest facing target manage-
ment. See Defensive Tactics, supra note 19, at 582-83. The management purpose approach
would not be as effective as an absolute prohibition against agreements that preclude com-
petitive bidding, because target management will still risk making anticompetitive
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Although the Santa Fe ruling required that the Mobil court carefully
avoid an inquiry into management's reasons for opposing the tender of-
fer, the Santa Fe ruling relied on the existence of adequate state law
remedies for fiduciary violations."2 The current trend under state law
fiduciary standards, however, favors management's use of defensive tac-
tics to thwart hostile tender offers.103 A shareholder, denied an opportu-
nity to tender his shares to the highest bidder, has little chance of recovery
under present state fiduciary standards' because management only must
meet the minimal fiduciary standards under the business judgment rule,0 '
or a standard of an equivalent nature,"6 all of which create a presumption
in favor of defensive action by management.'0 Allowing frustrated bid-
agreements so long as management is confident that the agreement can stand legally. Ad-
ditionally, the management purpose approach will require courts to make a more extensive
investigation, perhaps even requiring trial, whereas a per se prohibition would enable courts
to provide swift injunctive relief against management.
1 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977) (state law provides ade-
quate remedies for breach of fiduciary obligation absent fraud).
103 See Defensive Tactics, supra note 19, at 594-601 (1982). Recent federal court decisions
on state fiduciary claims indicate that a plaintiff, frustrated from tendering his shares by
management's action, carries a heavy burden in proving improper motive because the plaintiff
must show that management's opposition to the bidder was motivated solely by a desire
to retain control of the target. See id. at 600; see also Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646
F.2d 271, 295 (7th Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1982) (burden on plaintiffs to
demonstrate directors' bad faith in defeating bid); Treadway Co. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d
357, 381-82 (2d Cir. 1980) (same); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 293 (3rd Cir.
1980) (plaintiff must show primary or sole motive of defendant was to retain control); Crouse-
Hinds Co., v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702-03 (2d Cir. 1980) (same); Whittaker Corp.
v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933, 951 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (failure to show primary motive was to retain
control). The federal courts' current approach is not consistent with earlier state court deci-
sions that placed the burden of proof upon target management when management acted
to retain control. See Defensive Tactics, supra note 19, at 589-92, 596, 600.
I" See infra note 107 and supra. note 103 (presumption favoring management under
state fiduciary law). But see Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294, 305-06 (D. Del.
1981) (target directors repurchasing corporate stock in context of tender offer have burden
to justify purchase as primarily in corporate interest).
105 See Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tac-
tics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819, 822-24 (1981) (business judgment rule is inade-
quate standard for judging managerial action in tender offer context). The business judg-
ment rule is defined as the position that absent bad faith or some other corrupt motive,
directors normally are not liable to the corporation for mistakes of judgment, whether of
law or fact, if the directors have acted within the corporation's powers and the directors'
authority. Id. at 822 (citing Crammer v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 274 (3rd
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1127 (1979).
101 See Gilson, supra note 105, at 824-25. Several state courts apply the fairness stan-
dard, a test that developed under common law to review corporate contracts. Id. at 824.
If the court finds that the contract is unfair to the corporation, the court will invalidate
the contract. See id. at 824-25 (fairness test is inadequate measure of management's discharge
of duty to corporation in context of change of control).
107 See Gilson, supra note 105, at 822-24. The business judgment rule is premised on
the theory that corporate management, not courts, are in the best position to make business
decisions that enhance shareholder interests. See id. The rule's premise extends to target
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ders to bring section 14(e) manipulation claims for injunctive relief that
focus on the effects of a defensive tactic on competitive bidding would
deter such action by target management in the context of competing tender
offers."8 In addition, a grant of relief at the preliminary injunction stage
is a more direct and less drastic method for protecting shareholders' and
competing bidders' interests than a shareholder damage action for breach
of fiduciary duty after the fact.19
Although the REIT and Scherer courts did not extend the section 14(e)
Mobil analysis to defensive tactics used by management in situations in-
volving a single bidder, " a section 14(e) manipulation claim can serve a
useful purpose when at least two bidders are competing for the same block
of stock."' One critic who opposes almost all defensive tender offer tac-
tics has expressed approval for managerial efforts to enlist "white knights"
because shareholders clearly benefit from competitive bidding."2 Manage-
ment, by seeking a "white knight," evidences dislike for the original bid-
der or the bidder's price, but management in effect has admitted resigna-
tion to the idea of a tender offer or an inability to use other defensive
tactics."' In a bidding contest, at least one tender offer has taken place,
and, therefore, a court should closely scrutinize any action that might
restrict competitive bids."' By limiting the focus of section 14(e) manipula-
management's defensive actions against a tender offer because management is in the best
position to evaluate the merits of a proposed offer. Defensive Tactics, supra note 19, at
581. Several commentators, however, have argued that an inherent conflict of interest arises
whenever target management is faced with a hostile tender offer because an offer provides
shareholders the opportunity to sell their shares for a premium over market price and
at the same time is the best method for forcibly unseating target management. See Gilson,
supra note 105, at 819; Defensive Tactics, supra note 19, at 580 n.7, 594 n.136 (listing of
different proposals by commentators concerning proper role of management in tender offer
situation).
Ill See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 371-73 (6th Cir. 1981) (allowing
bidders to bring § 14(e) claims will protect shareholders' interests), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
982 (1982).
109 See id. at 373 (citing Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 US. 1, 42 (1977) (under injunc-
tive relief court may structure remedy on case-by-case basis)); see also supra note 18 (bidder
is in best position to quickly challenge Williams Act violation because of amassed informa-
tion bidder possesses on target).
11 See supra text accompanying notes 64-78 (Scherer court found unlikelihood of ir-
reparable harm to bidder) and 87-90 (REIT court found that trustees of target acted in
good faith).
... See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (competitive bidding for block of stock
raises the premium for tendering shareholders).
1' See Gilson, supra note 105, at 867-75 (advocating managerial bargaining to secure
higher premium for target's stock).
113 See Gilson, supra note 19, at 776 n.3 (whether defensive tactic of seeking white knight
should be regarded more properly as negotiated surrender); see also Buffalo Forge Co. v.
Ogden Corp. [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 99,079, at 95,133-34
(W.D.N.Y. 1983) (target faced suddenly with hostile tender offer considered various defen-
sive tactics but only acted to secure a rival bidder).
1" See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Corp., 669 F.2d 366, 373-77 (6th Cir. 1981) (court
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tion claims to the competitive bidding situation, courts will insure the
expressed congressional desire to maintain competitive bidding' and will
protect shareholders' right to tender to the highest bidder.' 6
In addition to the section 14(e) manipulation claims brought by bid-
ders, the management of some target companies have attempted to con-
vert the Mobil section 14(e) manipulation analysis into a weapon to op-
pose tender offers."' In Pacific Realty Trust v. APC Investments, Inc.,
1 8
the Ninth Circuit considered whether to permanently enjoin a hostile bid-
der confronted with a valid bylaw limitation when the target company
alleges that the bid constitutes a manipulative act under section 14(e).119
Under the bylaw amendment involved in Pacific Realty, no stockholder
could own more than 9.8% of the shares of Pacific Realty Trust
(PacTrust)."° After passing the bylaw amendment, PacTrust's trustees
initiated proceedings in federal and state court to enjoin the prior tender
offer of APC Investments, Inc. (APC)."2' In the state action, an Oregon
trial court upheld the validity of the bylaw, although the trustees of Pac-
Trust had passed the bylaw in response to the tender offer by APC."
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon, after hearing
of the state court decision, held that to proceed with the tender offer in
the face of a valid bylaw limitation would constitute a violation of section
14(e)."' The district court permanently enjoined APC's tender offer because
full disclosure would not remove the obstacle created by the bylaw. 4
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the tender offer could proceed
lawfully as long as APC adequately disclosed how the bylaw might affect
tendering shareholders.' The Ninth Circuit explained, however, that
found that lockup agreement for valuable asset precluded competitive bidding) cert. denied,
455 U.S. 982 (1982). See generally Bebchuk, supra note 54 (advocates rule enabling manage-
ment to solicit competitive bids so long as management does not obstruct any tender offers).
... See supra note 41 (congressional history supports competitive bidding).
116 See supra notes 38-54 and accompanying text (arguments supporting application of
5 14(e) to protect shareholders' right to tender for highest possible bid).
... See infra text accompanying notes 11849 (target management claiming tender offer
is manipulative under S 14(e)).
.,. 685 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1982).
"' Id. at 1085-88.
'' Id. at 1085; see supra note 88 (REIT court distinguished bylaw in REIT from bylaw
in Pacifw Realty).
:1 685 F2d at 1085.
' Id. The court in Pacific Realty Trust v. APC Inv., Inc. stated that although the state
trial court had upheld the validity of the bylaw, the state court refused to enjoin APC
from proceeding with the tender offer because a possible future violation of the valid bylaw
did not warrant an injunction. Id. at 1085 & n.3.
"3 Id. at 1085 & n.3.
124 Id. at 1085. The district court in Pacifi Realty stated that full disclosure would
not protect shareholders from the illegality of proceeding with the tender offer in the face
of the valid bylaw that restricted stock ownership. Id.
... Id. at 1087-88.
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although disclosure is the preferred remedy for defects in a tender offer
under the Williams Act, other courts have found at least two situations
in which a court might impose a permanent injunction for violations of
the Williams Act. " 6 Under the first situation, a court might use a perma-
nent injunction to punish a bidder who intentionally withheld information
from the target company's shareholders.'" The Ninth Circuit stated,
however, that the deterrent situation did not apply in Pacific Realty
because the district court found no willful misconduct by APC.'28 Under
the second situation, the Ninth Circuit explained that companies commit
violations of section 14(e) that cannot be cured by disclosure to the
shareholders." Although the Ninth Circuit relied solely on Mobil as an
example of the second situation, the court distinguished Mobil from the
facts in Pacific Realty because unlike the agreements in Mobil, a contin-
uance of APC's tender offer would not artificially affect the price of Pac-
Trust's shares. 3
The Pacific Realty court rejected PacTrust's contention that contin-
uation of the offer constituted a manipulative act under section 14(e) and
explained that full disclosure would more than adequately protect the in-
terests of PacTrust's shareholders for several reasons.13 ' The court stated
that APC might lawfully complete the tender offer in spite of the bylaw
limitation.132  The court also stated that an appeal was pending in the
Oregon courts on the state trial court's decision upholding the validity
12 Id. at 1086; see infra text accompanying notes 127-30 (courts could permanently en-
join tender offer for willful violations of disclosure rules or for practices that are manipulative
under S 14(e)).
'" See 685 F.2d at 1086. Although the Pacific Realty court suggested that a court might
permanently enjoin a bidder who willfully violated the Williams Act's disclosure provisions,
to this date no court has ever permanently enjoined the completion of a tender offer solely
for violation of the disclosure provisions of S 14(d) and S 14(e). See E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN,
& G. BERLSTEIN. DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 134 (1977); see
also Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1316 (W.D. Mich. 1978). The Berman
district court stated that the court would permanently enjoin the bidder's tender offer if
the bidder refused to obey a court order to disclose the nature and scope of questionable
foreign payment transactions. See id. The Berman court, however, never reached the issue
because the bidder subsequently withdrew the tender offer. See id.
10 685 F.2d at 1086.
129 Id.
11 Id. The Pacific Realty court did not explain its reasoning in determining that contin-
uance of the tender offer in spite of the valid bylaw would not artificially affect the value
of the target's stock. Id.
131 Id. at 1087; see infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text (Pacific Realty court's reasons
for continuing tender offer in spite of bylaw).
3' 685 F.2d at 1087. The Pacific Realty court explained that the possibility remained
that PacTrust could lose its tax status without APC taking over. Id. Assuming that Pac-
Trust lost the tax status, the court believed that the trustees would rescind the bylaw
because no legitimate reason would remain to support the bylaw. Id. The court stated that
the shareholders might decide to call a special shareholder meeting to rescind the bylaw
if APC's bid offers the shareholders a substantial premium. Id.
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of the bylaw limitation."' The Pacific Realty court sustained a preliminary
injunction against APC's tender offer until the district court determined
whether APC had adequately disclosed all the possible effects of continu-
ing with the offer under the bylaw limitation.
13 4
Although the Pacific Realty court did not express disapproval of the
target company's right to raise a manipulation claim against a bidder, the
Fourth Circuit in Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn," challenged a target company's
right to claim that a tender offer constituted a manipulative scheme under
section 14(e)." 8 In Dan River, management of Dan River, Inc. (Dan River)
claimed that a two-level tender offer 37 by the Icahn Investment Group
(Icahn)" constituted a "bait and switch" scheme in violation of section
14(e). 39 The first of Icahn's bids represented the alleged "bait," an offer
to buy 3.1 million shares of Dan River at eighteen dollars a share. "' The
second bid represented the "switch," an offer to buy only seven hundred
thousand shares at fifteen dollars a share if management resisted Icahn's
133 Id. The Pacific Realty court observed that the state trial court judge had admitted
his limited knowledge of securities law and the possibility of reversal on appeal. Id.
11 Id. at 1088. The Pacific Realty court stated that if a later determination required
that APC divest itself of the stock tender, state law would not necessarily require recission
as the remedy. Id. at 1087. The court stated that the shareholders probably would retain
the premium gained from tendering their stock and that APC would have to incur the loss
by selling off the stock tendered in the offer. Id. Regardless of the possible outcome, the
court believed that full disclosure would apprise the shareholders of all possible risks and
benefits and allow the shareholders to choose from themselves. Id.
13 [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,043, at 94,954 (4th Cir. 1983).
1 Id. at 94,961.
"7See infra text accompanying notes 14041 (describing terms of Icahn's two-level tender
offer).
'" See Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,616 at 93,059 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The Icahn Investment Group has been involved in several
tender offer controversies. See id. As the Dan River court explained in reviewing the target's
complaint, Icahn on several occasions has purchased a significant interest in a company.
[1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,043, at 94,956. Icahn then pressures
management to buy Icahn's interest out or find a white knight, either of which alternatives
will realize a substantial profit for Icahn. Id. Icahn rarely has to actually contest control
because management usually is frightened enough by Icahn's mere presence that manage-
ment will buy out Icahn's interest at an inflated price. Id.
1" [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,043, at 94,957. In addition
to the S 14(e) violation in Dan River, the target company, Dan River, alleged that the bid-
der, Icahn, violated § 10(b) of the '34 Act by proposing that Dan River management buy
out Icahn's interest in Dan River or face a takeover attempt. Id. Dan River also alleged
that Icahn's disclosures under the Williams Act were insufficient and misleading, and that
Icahn violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act by financing its
interest in Dan River with money derived from "racketeering" or extortionate activity.
See id. at 94,956-57; 18 U.S.C. S 1961-68 (1976) (provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act). Additionally, Dan River alleged that Icahn intended to "loot"
the target in violation of state corporation law. See [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 99,043, at 94,956.
" [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,043, at 94,961.
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first offer.141 Dan River claimed that Icahn's two-level offer manipulated
the shareholders because Icahn, believing that management would defend
against the bid, had made the first offer only to lure the shareholders
into tendering on the second offer.'
The Fourth Circuit denied Dan River preliminary injunctive relief
because Dan River failed to show irreparable harm or a likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits."' The court seriously questioned Dan River's substan-
tive claim under section 14(e) because legislative history and judicial prece-
dent indicated that section 14(e) only required full disclosure. " Although
the Fourth Circuit referred to Mobil as the sole authority for Dan River's
manipulative claim, the court distinguished Mobil from the situation fac-
ing Dan River.4 , The Fourth Circuit described the option agreement in
Mobil as an artificial manipulation outside the market that affected supply
and demand forces within the market.46 In Dan River, however, the Fourth
Circuit explained that the allegedly manipulative tender offer represented
an offer actually in the securities marketplace. '47 The Dan River court
stated that all tender offers affect the market place, and to prohibit tender
offers on that basis alone would preclude all tender offers." Although
the Fourth Circuit recognized that the two-level offer created some uncer-
tainty regarding the offer, the court stated that most tender offers in-
clude conditions that introduce some uncertainty as to whether
shareholders should accept the offer.'
141 Id.
'42 Id. The Dan River court only found one case in which target management made
a claim similar to Dan River's bait and switch claim. Id. at 94,962; see Cities Serv. Co. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 541 F. Supp. 1220 (D. Del. 1982). In Cities Service, the bidder made
a "friendly" tender offer for 46% of the target's shares at $50 per share. Id. at 1221. Target
management rejected the bid, whereupon the bidder responded with a hostile tender offer
for 15% of the target's shares at $45 per share. Id. at 1221-22. The target claimed that
the bidder never had the financing to support the original bid, but made misleading statements
to that effect in order to convince the target's shareholders of the bidder's ability to con-
summate the original tender offer. Id. The target alleged that the bidder intended to
manipulate the market by its misrepresentations. Id. at 1222. The target also alleged that
the bidder's scheme aimed for the tender of 46% of the target's stock at the second, lower
offer to enable the bidder to obtain the financing afterwards to purchase control of the
target. Id. The Cities Service court denied the target's motion for preliminary injunction,
holding that full disclosure apparently had been made and, therefore, the target was unlikely
to prevail on the claim. See id. at 1224-25.
1 [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,043, at 94,958.
1 Id.. at 94,961-62; see supra text accompanying notes 13-14 ('34 Act primarily requires
full disclosure). But see [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,043, at 94,966
(Butzner, J., dissenting) (although two-level tender offer is case of first impression, likelihood
exists that Icahn violated 5 14(e)).
.5 [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,043, at 94,962 n.10.
148 Id.; see supra notes 35 & 45 (discussion of definition of "manipulation").
1,' [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,043, at 94,962 n.10.
148 Id. at 94,962.
1,9 Id. The Dan River court stated that other tender offers have been allowed contain-
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The Dan River court's reasons for not characterizing tender offers
as manipulative under section 14(e) indicate the likelihood of failure for
similar claims by management." Allowing management to characterize
an offer as manipulative under section 14(e) that has in all other respects
complied with the Williams Act provisions would result in upsetting the
balance between bidder and target management that Congress intended
to provide under the Act."' Although certain bidders appear quite
predatory in their motives and behavior,'52 diligent and fair disclosure of
a bidder's background and past tactics will enable management to pre-
sent target management's position to the shareholders.", Ultimately, the
decision to tender rests with fully informed shareholders who, as owners
of the corporation, should have complete freedom to exercise their right.'4
Dan River and other recent decisions illustrate federal courts' reluc-
tance to extend the Mobil section 14(e) manipulation analysis to tender
offers' 1' or to defensive tactics intended by management to maintain the
target's corporate entity." Nevertheless, the current inadequacy of state
law remedies for frustrated bidders and shareholders has led to bidders'
equitable relief requests under section 14(e) that require federal courts
to make quick and efficient decisions." Although a majority of courts ad-
ing clauses that permitted withdrawal of the offer in the event of litigation. Id.; see Lipton
& Steinberger, supra note 76, at § 1.7.11.
" See supra text accompanying notes 143-49 (Dan River court's reasons for unlikelihood
of S 14(e) violation).
"' See 113 CONG. REC. 24664 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams) (Act designed to avoid "tip-
ping the scales" in favor of either side).
in See supra note 138 (description of Icahn's tactics that compel management to buy
out Icahn's interest for a premium).
i" See [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,043, at 94,961-62; Cities
Serv. Co. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 541 F. Supp. 1220, 1224-25 (D. Del. 1982) (full disclosure
will adequately protect management's interest to shareholders).
'- See generally Gilson, supra note 19; Friedenberg, supra note 19; Bebchuk, supra note
54 (commentators advocating greater freedom for target shareholders in tender offer context).
' See supra text accompanying notes 117-49 (discussion of recent decisions that have
not extended Mobi's § 14(e) analysis to tender offers).
1% See supra text accompanying notes 63-101 (discussion of cases that did not extend
Mobil's § 14(e) analysis to defensive tactics initiated in context of single tender offer).
'S? See supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text (discussion of inadequacy of state
law remedies for frustrated bidders and shareholders). But see Tender Offer Defensive Tac-
tics, supra note 8, at 655-58 (recognizing general problem in tender offer context but argues
against patchwork federal approach and suggests congressional reassessment to update
Williams Act to changing environment); see also Wall St. J., Jan. 13, 1982, at 3, col. 5. A
study published by W.T. Grimm & Co. indicated that the number of hostile tender offers
in 1981 rose 42% from 1980 to 75, and that 28 target companies opposed the bids, up from
12 in 1980. Id. The consultant company's report states that only 15 of the 28 were suc-
cessful in warding off the hostile bidder. Id. The W.T. Grimm & Co. report suggests that
the balance has not tipped in favor of target management, and thus raises the question
whether a hostile bidder and shareholders need greater protection under an expanded defini-
tion of § 14(e) manipulation. See id.
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vise against the use of a section 14(e) manipulation claim for reasons other
than nondisclosure, some manipulative practices cannot be cured by
disclosure in the tender offer context.158 A strict application of the Mobil
analysis to managerial actions that clearly restrict competitive bidding
would provide legitimate protection for the shareholders. '59 By limiting
the courts' focus to the effects of a unilateral defensive action when at
least two bidders are involved, federal courts will avoid the Supreme
Court's prohibition against establishing a federal fiduciary standard." An
extension of Mobil's section 14(e) manipulation analysis to claims against
tender offers, however, would not provide shareholders with additional
protection."' Congress has declared disclosure as the proper means by
which the bidder and hostile management can present the facts to the
shareholders."2 Allowing management to characterize a tender offer as
manipulative that has in all other respects complied with the Williams
Act would contravene Congress' intention of maintaining a balance be-
tween the bidder and management and would deprive the shareholders
of their right to tender their stock as owners of the company.''
W. GERARD FALLON, JR.
" See supra text accompanying notes 22-31 (discussion of Mobil holding that fully dis-
closed option agreement constituted manipulative act in violation of S 14(e)).
119 See supra text accompanying notes 110-16 (reasons why courts should scrutinize
managerial tactics in context of competing tender offers); see also Lynch & Steinberg, The
Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 901, 911-12 (1979)
(shareholder right to discover material facts of transaction is worthless if not given oppor-
tunity to tender shares). But see Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 28 (1977) (Williams
Act's express policy of neutrality scarcely suggests intent to confer new rights upon bid-
ders whose activities prompted Act in first place).
"6 See Santa Fe Indus., v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977) (Santa Fe Court prohibited
inquiry into fairness of transaction).
161 See supra text accompanying notes 117-49 (Pacific Realty and Dan River court's re-
jection of claims characterizing tender offer manipulative under S 14(e)).
"I See 113 CONG. REc. 854, 855 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams) (Act's purpose is to pro-
vide shareholders full and fair disclosure while presenting bidder and management equal
opportunity to present their case).
16 See 113 CONG. REC. 24664 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams) (Act designed to avoid "tip-
ping the scales" in favor of management or bidders).
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